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 This paper argues for a model of a corruption constraint on organizational growth and 
development in the form of a business ethics glass ceiling.  Although the problem of corruption‘s 
negative impact on economic growth is well documented, this paper‘s contribution is to propose a 
cohesive model to show how corruption combines with other influences such as weak corporate 
governance to act as a serious constraint on the business growth of local firms.  This previously 
unidentified barrier to business success is marked by corruption and the model particularly applies to 
small and medium-sized and family businesses in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  These 
businesses are vital to the economic growth and political stability of that region, but corruption makes it 
difficult for them to grow, overcome a financing gap, and become stronger organizations.  Corruption 
also drains firm resources and warps normal incentives like transparency and accountability that 
encourage expansion because firms may choose to appear unprofitable to avoid corruption.  As a result, 
the growth of these businesses is limited when they remain poorly run and small in size as they attempt 
to avoid an onslaught of corruption.  This short-term coping strategy fosters the glass ceiling constraint 
that is the subject of this paper.   
The business ethics glass ceiling is formed by several factors.  These influences are weak 
corporate governance, social and cultural aspects, and political and economic pressures.  This paper 
focuses on the role of corporate governance and first describes the constraints and the place of these 
businesses in MENA, before using the regional example of Lebanon to demonstrate the stunting nature 
of the corruption-influenced ceiling and its role in producing a financing gap.  Finally, the paper presents 
recommendations for breaking through the glass ceiling and provides suggestions for additional research 
on the intersection of corruption and ethics constraints in emerging markets. 
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I.  Introduction 
Imagine a business and legal climate in which 6%, on average, of a company‘s sales disappear 
because that income goes to fund bribes,
1
 and where the political system is bloated with excessive public 
sector employment
2
 and political regimes opposed to economic reform are the norm.
3
  If the same 
system lacks minority shareholder protections and corporate formation is difficult,
4
 and, as a result, the 
most educated in the workforce choose to work abroad,
5
 such a region is, to say the least, not ideal for 
building a successful business enterprise.  These obstacles to business growth and development do not 
merely afflict some hypothetical region, but are symptomatic of a real and economically important one:  
the Middle East and North Africa.   
With such seemingly insurmountable disincentives to growth and investment, and such 
uncertainty bombarding a typical company from the outside, it is no surprise that 65% of the Middle 
Eastern and North African countries surveyed are ranked as only having a medium-level human 
development in the United Nations Human Development index
6
 and, on average and despite some 
                                                 
1
 Rhonda Roumani, The Hidden Costs of Business in Lebanon, Survey finds Bribery is Common:  Experts say that if Local 
Companies Adopt International Standards, they Benefit in the Long Term and will be able to Complete Globally, THE DAILY 
STAR, June 10, 2004 (citing a 2004 survey by the Lebanese Transparency Association and the InfoPro Center for Economic 
Information). 
2
 The Middle East and North Africa as a region employs nearly 18% of its total workforce in the public sector, a higher rate 
than any other region.  Robert P. Beschel, The Challenge of Civil Service Reform, 4 WORLD BANK MENA GOVERNANCE 
NEWS & NOTES 4, 6 graph 1, Jan. 2010.  In some countries, such as Egypt, 20-30% of government workers may be 
redundant.  Id. at 6.  The potential reasons for over-employment by governments may reflect some of the cultural and 
corruption issues of the region, including as a means of ―soaking up excess employment,‖ the patronage system, the public‘s 
desire for comfortable and secure jobs, and wealth distribution.  Id. at 6-7.  
3
  Ian Ayres & Jonathan R. Macey, Institutional and Evolutionary Failure and Economic Development in the Middle East 
from the Symposium: Nation-Building in the Middle East, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 397, 400 (2005) (arguing that in the Middle 
East, ―incumbent ruling elites rationally oppose economic development when such development is likely to lead to social 
changes that threaten their hold on power.  It is this rational calculation – not culture, history, or religion – that sustains 
obstacles to growth in the Middle East‖). 
4
  Id. at 411 (―Starting a new business in a Middle East or North African country is unusually difficult.  These countries have 
some of the largest capital requirements for start-up businesses anywhere in the world.‖ citing a World Bank and 
International Finance Committee report) (citation omitted). 
5
  For some countries in the Middle East much of their human capital is outsourced to other nations in the region.  See Adam 
Schreck & Jamal Halaby, Dubai Downturn Sends Ripples Throughout Arab World, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan 7, 2010, 
(http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_14139789 (last visited Mar. 1, 2010) (―Overall, worker wages from the Gulf—
including Dubai and other places like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait—account for a whopping 15 to 20 percent of the economy in 
countries like Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt that are considerably poorer than the oil-fueled monarchies of the [Persian] Gulf 
[states]‖). In some non-petroleum producing Middle East countries the income for expatriate workers may amount to 25% of 
the economy; see Osama Habib, Fallout from Dubai Crisis will Spare Lebanese Economy, DAILY STAR, Nov. 30, 2009 (“The 
[Lebanese] central bank said recently that up to $7 billion in remittances have entered Lebanon in the first 10 months of 
2009, representing 25 percent of the country‘s GDP‖). 
6
 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, Arab Human Development Report 2009: Challenges to Human Security in 
the Arab Countries, 231, Table 3 (2009). 
4 
 
improvement, fall in the lower half of countries ranked by ease of doing business.
7
  It will also not be a 
surprise that with these problems the region also ranks poorly on the business ethics issue of corruption, 
as demonstrated by Transparency International‘s most recent Corruption Perceptions Index.
8
   
With such a disheartening status quo what should a firm‘s management do within its own control 
to improve its chances of profitability amid widespread corruption?  The answer to this question is not 
necessarily clear or simple. While the contours of political corruption from the demand side of bribe 
askers is well mapped by scholars, the implications of a business engaging in self help through better 
corporate governance is not often examined.  As discussed below, experts have concluded that 
corruption inhibits economic development in developing countries at the national level.  However, this 
paper goes deeper to discuss how the problem of corruption  defined broadly to include bribery as 
well intra-organization abuses like the abuse of minority shareholders  also limits the growth of small 
and medium-sized businesses by acting as a drain on their resources and creating disincentives to 
improve corporate governance by fostering a situation where these small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) want to stay small and appear unprofitable to avoid facing corruption.  In this way the scourge 
of corruption, and how it drains businesses of capital and reduces trust in government, and the problem 
of inadequate economic development are connected.  This combined set of disincentives ultimately stunt 
enterprise and profit growth, and perpetuate an environment ripe for corruption, thus leading to the 
business ethics glass ceiling.  Indentifying this situation formally for the first time and explaining this 
barrier to growth, and the role of corporate governance in creating and later addressing the barrier, is the 
main contribution of this paper.  
Barriers to organizational growth, stability, and profitability afflict all types of businesses – 
regardless of size, ownership structure, or location of the business entity.  Much of the extant research 
concerning corruption from management scholars focuses on the organization‘s role in corruption 
control,
9
 while the extensive political science literature evaluates the role of the state and its bureaucracy 
in perpetuating public corruption.
10
  Economic analysis of corruption tends to examine the costs and the 
                                                 
7
  World Bank & International Monetary Fund, Doing Business in the Arab World 2010: Comparing Regulation in 20 
Economies, 1-3 (2009). 
8
  See Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2009, infra, notes 24 and 35, and accompanying text. 
9
  See generally, Blake E. Ashforth et. al, Corruption in Organizations, Introduction to the Special Topic Forum: Re-Viewing 
Organizational Corruption, 33 ACAD. MANAGEMENT REV. 670 (2008); and Donald Lange, A Multidimensional 
Conceptualization of Organizational Corruption Control, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 710 (2008). 
10
  See, e.g., leading scholarship such as POLITICAL CORRUPTION:  CONCEPTS & CONTEXTS, 3rd ed. (Arnold J. Heidensheimer 
& Michael Johnston, eds.) (2009); MICHAEL JOHNSTON, WEALTH, POWER, AND DEMOCRACY (2005); and ROBERT 
KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1991). 
5 
 
incentives behind corrupt transactions, as well as the rationale of corrupt economic actors.
11
  Law and 
ethics scholars have provided intellectual leadership and extended the discussion to the role of law and 
contract theory,
12
 and to the corporate governance of large, usually public companies in the developed 
world.
13
  This paper combines and extends this previous research to illuminate a specific issue affecting 
the significant and pervasive economic entities of small and medium-sized family businesses, 
particularly in the Middle East:  the stifling issue of corruption and the related barriers to financing 
stemming from weak corporate governance.
14
  It argues that there is a business ethics ―glass ceiling‖ 
created by a confluence of social and cultural, political and economic, and, most importantly, weak 
corporate governance and legal issues.
15
  Together these factors artificially constrain the development of 
many small and medium-sized family businesses in the region.  This is a particularly troubling 
confluence of factors because SMEs in developing regions are already at a disadvantage because of the 
so-called financing gap.
16
  Through the example of Lebanon this paper discusses the corporate 
governance and related problems confronting businesses in the Middle East and how an ethical glass 
ceiling influenced by corruption and weak corporate governance restricts their development, even if it is 
not apparent to the individual organization.  In sum, the business ethics glass ceiling makes it difficult 
for businesses to grow, both because of the costs imposed in terms of bribe payments and because the 
constraint changes the incentive structure to encourage businesses to appear unprofitable to avoid being 
a target of corruption and, thus, harm their prospects for entity growth and for wider economic 
development.  
                                                 
11
 See, e.g., JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND REFORM (2007) at 1-15 
(cataloguing the development of economists‘ research on corruption transactions and incentives, costs, and social 
implications).  See also, the empirical and economic case studies in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
CORRUPTION (Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed. 2006).  
12
 See, e.g., THOMAS DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, TIES THAT BIND:  A SOCIAL CONTRACTS APPROACH TO BUSINESS 
ETHICS (1999) at 222-230 (applying the logic of Integrative Social Contracts Theory to bribery to demonstrate that the 
practice violates microsocial contractual duties, is not an authentic norm, and violates one or more hypernorms). 
13
  See, e.g., Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679 
(2009) (discussing the role of corporate monitorships at U.S. companies as a condition of a settlement with the federal 
government, including a delayed prosecution agreement). 
14
 In a study of the effects of corruption bureaucratic institutions, growth rates, and investment in human capital in MENA, 
Professor Imene Guetat found that the direct effects of weak institutions and the indirect effects of corruption as compared to 
Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  Imene Guetat, The Effects of Corruption on Growth Performance of the 
MENA Countries, 30 J. ECON. & FINANCE 208, 213-218 (2006). 
15
  The existence of corruption, legal, and financing constraints on SME growth is discussed by World Bank economists in 
Thorsten Beck et. al, Financial and Legal Constraints to Growth: Does Firm Size Matter?, 60 J. FINANCE 137 (2005) 
(concluding from a global sample of SMEs that corruption, legal, and financing constraints all have a negative impact as a 
percentage of sales of SMEs to the amount of -5.2%, -6.3%, and -8.7%, respectively. The authors also found that institutional 
and financial development will positively impact SMEs the most). 
16
 For an overview of the extensive challenges faced by SMEs in the search for growth capital, see generally, ORGANISATION 
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE SME FINANCING GAP, VOLUME 1:  THEORY AND EVIDENCE (2006). 
6 
 
Ultimately, some recommendations for breaking through the ethical glass ceiling are presented, 
as well as a call for additional research into the impact of this constraint on businesses throughout the 
region and the developing world.  These recommendations also contribute to the underlying logic of 
reform initiatives because they recognize the potential of the combined impact of improved corporate 
governance and a reduced acquiescence to external corruption as a conscious choice by these businesses.  
In other words, this approach also has normative value because it isolates and addresses reforms that are 
within the control of the entities, as opposed to seemingly intractable macro-level institutional failings. 
This paper sets out to map the landscape of the corporate governance failings that cause the 
business ethics glass ceiling.   To accomplish that goal it is necessary to also consider the closely related 
political and social/cultural issues that contribute to the creation of this barrier, which acts as a constraint 
on the growth and development of small and medium businesses generally, and family businesses, 
specifically. 
The business ethics issue of corruption and questions of organizational factors influencing 
corrupt behavior remain a topic of much discussion among scholars.
17
  Evidence also suggests that both 
internal and external change triggers can cause and increase corruption in business organizations.
18
  
Corruption has legal, social and cultural, and economic and political components
19
 and simply attacking 
one of the causes is inadequate, thus a portfolio approach to dealing with the issues has been proposed 
by scholars.
20
  Both general management
21
 and business law and ethics scholars
22
 have addressed the 
importance of proper governance systems as a way of incorporating stakeholder salience and business 
ethics.  
While there is a wealth of writing on the varied topics of organizational ethics, corruption, 
stakeholder approaches, corporate governance, and small/medium and family enterprises, less work has 
been available that combines these issues.  This paper aims to, in part, synthesize and tailor existing 
                                                 
17
  See, e.g., Ashforth et al., supra note 9.   
18
  Kelly D. Martin et al., Organizational Change, Normative Control Deinstitutionalization, and Corruption, 19 BUS. ETHICS 
Q. 105, 118-122 (Jan. 2009). 
19
  For example, the comprehensive typology of anti-corruption at the organizational level is found in Lange, supra note 9.  
Professor Lange‘s categorization, from the organization‘s perspective, includes an assumption that, ―organizational leaders 
presume that the social pressures -- normative and coercive -- existing in the organization‘s broader social and regulative 
context will necessarily permeate the organization‘s borders to affect the behavior of its members.  Operating under this 
assumption, organizational leaders presume that the social pressures or legal/regulative sanctions applied by forces external 
to the organization can cause members to avoid corrupt behaviors.‖ Id. at 714. 
20
  See David W. Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach; The C2 Principles (Combating 
Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT‘L L. J. 593 (2000) (discussing the ―C2 Principles‖ as a means of fighting international 
corruption).  
21
  See, e.g., ABBAS ALKHAFAJI, A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1989). 
22
  See, e.g., TIMOTHY L. FORT, ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE: BUSINESS AS MEDIATING  INSTITUTION 119-135 (2001). 
7 
 
research and focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA, or simply Middle East).
23
  This is 
because MENA is a region in the developing world that is often absent from business ethics and 
corporate governance scholarship, despite its political and financial importance and the prevalence of 
corruption in the region.
24
  It is also the case that small and medium-sized family-owned and managed 
businesses are particularly prominent in the Middle East.
25
  This paper concludes that corporate 
governance failings and cultural issues in the Middle East, as well as the insular nature of small and 
medium-sized family enterprises, contribute to the debilitating corruption in the region, as in other 
developing areas of the world.  
Small and medium-sized family-owned or controlled businesses in the Middle East, including 
the Republic of Lebanon, have particularly poor corporate governance related to minority shareholder 
protections and corruption controls.
26
  As a result there are inadequate systems in place that are intended 
to promote ethical behavior or defend against corruption overtures from the outside.  Those problems, 
coupled with cultural and political influences, create an ethics glass ceiling, past which small and 
medium family enterprises cannot grow.  This is because by succumbing to corruption they are cutting 
off their own access to certain key stakeholders:  outside equity investors, and the related capital and 
expertise that come with those investors.  Moreover, by succumbing to corrupt forces and engaging in 
bribery for short term gains, family businesses not only harm a range of internal stakeholders, but help 
perpetuate a corrupt system, which in turn harms societal interests and is an affront to the rule of law.
 27
 
Following this introductory section, Part I provides background and context for the role of 
corporate governance and the issue of corruption in the Middle East.  Part II presents the theoretical 
                                                 
23
  It would be overly simplistic to consider the idea of the Middle East or the Arab-speaking world as a monolith.  Therefore, 
for definitional ease, the countries considered in the Middle East and North Africa for purposes of this paper are the 
predominantly Arab-speaking nations and contained in Transparency International‘s definition, where the following eighteen 
countries are included:  Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine 
[West Bank and Gaza], Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.  An additional country, 
Israel, is ranked in the 2009 regional index. Transparency International, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional 
page, http://www.transparency.org/regional_pages/africa_middle_east/middle_east_and_north_africa_mena (last visited Mar. 
1, 2010).  Other configurations exist.  For instance the World Bank‘s definition of MENA includes three additional countries:  
Djibouti, Israel, and Malta.  World Bank, Middle East and North Africa – Countries,   http://go.worldbank.org/7UEP77ZCB0 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2010).   
24
  Of the nineteen MENA countries and territories ranked in the 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, sixteen scored a five or 
below, indicating a serious corruption problem in the region.  Transparency International, 2009 Corruption Perceptions 
Index, Regional Highlights: Middle East and North Africa (2009), available as a separate file through 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/regional_highlights (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
25
 See Nasser Saidi, Corporate Governance & Business Ethics in Lebanon, Remarks at the launch of RDCL Code of Business 
Ethics, Beirut 5, Apr. 28, 2004, http://www.rdcl.org.lb/nassersaidi.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
26
  For example, see NADA ABDELSATER-ABUSAMRA & NORMAN D. BISHARA, THE LEBANESE CODE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2006) (addressing failings in the corporate governance structures covered by the Lebanese Commercial Code 
and promoting transparency and accountability, as well as minority shareholder rights), 
27
  For a leading discussion of the short-term benefits and economic motivations and calculus behind corruption, see Philip 
M. Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, 19 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 1307, 1326-1331 (2004). 
8 
 
model of a business ethics glass ceiling as a constraint on growth and explains the factors leading to this 
barrier, with a focus on the role of law and corporate governance.  Part III discusses the role of family-
owned or controlled small and medium enterprises and the corporate form in relation to economic 
growth, globally and in the Middle East, as well as the business ethics concerns of these entities.   
Next, Part IV applies the observations in the previous sections to the case of family enterprises 
located in the Middle East and North Africa, with an emphasis on Lebanon as a regional example.  This 
section then applies the ethics glass ceiling model to the Lebanese example and argues that inadequate 
corporate governance and shortcomings in the country‘s corporate law scheme have fostered a situation 
where businesses are incentivized to embrace business ethics failings with regard to conflicts of interest 
and corruption.  As a result, these corporate governance problems – combined with political and 
economic, and cultural issues – discourage outside investors from providing capital and create a 
convergence of constraints stunting the growth of these companies.  Further, the insular nature of SMEs 
and family enterprises also creates a separation from potential stakeholder groups, such as outside 
financiers looking to place Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and contributes to a constraint on 
organizational growth and is a result of ethics failings, including corruption.  Part V provides 
suggestions for improving corporate governance and business ethics in the Middle East, as well as 
suggestions for further research.  Part VI briefly concludes the paper. 
 
 
II. The Model of a Business Ethics Glass Ceiling as a Constraint on Enterprise Growth 
 
A. The Business Ethics Glass Ceiling Metaphor and Model 
What exactly is meant by a business ethics glass ceiling to growth related to corporate 
governance?  In the context of this paper‘s discussion of an ethics glass ceiling, the metaphor is used as 
a means of illustrating an invisible barrier to family enterprise development in the MENA region.  
Specifically, the paper argues below that corruption and the fear of encountering corruption overtures
28
 
– as well as the insular nature of small and medium-sized family enterprises in MENA, and political and 
economic, and cultural issues – act as an invisible, artificial constraint on organizational growth and 
                                                 
28
 The prime example of a corporate ethical failing used throughout this paper is the well-recognized problem of corruption.  
Transparency International, the leading global anti-corruption non-governmental organization, states that, ―Corruption is 
operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain.‖  The organization goes further and draws a 
distinction, ―between ‗according to rule‘ corruption and ‗against the rule‘ corruption.  Facilitation payments, where a bribe is 
paid to receive preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former.  
The latter…is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing.‖  Transparency International, 
How do you define corruption?, available at: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last visited Mar. 





  For purposes of this paper the concept of corruption is defined broadly and covers unethical 
rent-seeking behavior beyond traditional coarse corruption (i.e., bribery), including actions such as 
fraud, the abuse of majority shareholder power over other shareholders, or the misuse of business 
assets.
30
  Corruption is generally seen as harmful and, accordingly, scholars agree that corruption 
decreases investment in emerging economies.
31
   
As envisioned here, the business ethics glass ceiling is the state of affairs that materializes when 
internal and external factors, particularly those related to corruption, create a situation where a business 
chooses to remain small and to appear unprofitable to avoid being a target for corruption.  In turn, 
businesses in this situation will appear to be poorly run with little prospect of growth and, thus, create a 
financial picture in which they appear to be poor investments.  Such companies may fail to choose (or 
are unable to choose because of local laws) corporate governance mechanisms that may have an ethical 
spillover, such as those embracing transparency and accountability as a check on corruption.
32
  The glass 
ceiling develops as a constraint because in reacting to corruption in their surroundings these SMEs and 
small and medium-sized family firms remain opaque and unable to access financing outside of family 
                                                 
29
  Similarly, in discussing the neo-institutional approach to modeling the more macro-level governance mechanisms of 
corrupt transactions della Porta and Vannucci point out that the economics of corruption literature identifies both a 
sociological and a political-economic approach to understanding these transactions.  Donatella della Porta & Alberto 
Vannucci, The Governance Mechanisms of Corrupt Transactions, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION 
152, 152-153. (Johann Graf Lambsdorff, et al., eds., 2005).  They proceed to argue that the theory should be augmented to 
include an understanding of the governance structures, with an emphasis in the ―(bad) social capital‖ required for corruption 
networks.  Id. at 153.  In contrast, the model explicated in this paper focuses on a different aspect of the business and legal 
issue of corruption as an ultimate constraint on growth by examining how the failings precipitated by weak corporate 
governance at the firm level combined with social and cultural, and political and economic, factors to stunt a firm‘s 
development.  
30
  See Norman D. Bishara & Cindy A. Schipani, Strengthening the Ties that Bind:  Preventing Corruption in the Executive 
Suite, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 765, 766 (2009).   
Recently Transparency International has joined the expansion of anti-corruption efforts into the area of addressing 
private sector corruption.  For example, in a 2008 report it co-sponsored with PricewaterhouseCoopers, Transparency 
International reported that nearly two-thirds of the multinational companies it surveyed were faced with some form of 
corruption.  The report presents an expanded discussion of corruption this way: 
 
A definition of corruption: There are many ways to define corruption. Robert B. Zoellick, president of the 
World Bank, says it is ―a cancer that steals from the poor, eats away at governance and moral fiber, and 
destroys trust‖ [citing World Bank, Press release, New Report Shows Strong Action in World Bank’s Global 
Anti-Corruption Fight, Dec. 18, 2007]. For the purposes of this report, corruption is defined as the misuse 
of entrusted power for private gain and encompasses a variety of issues, including bribery, conflicts of 
interest, extortion, embezzlement and fraud.  
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Confronting Corruption: The Business Case for an Effective Anti-Corruption Programme 3 (2008), 
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/private_sector (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
31
  See Nichols, supra note 27, at 1317-1321, citing Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681, 705 (1995) 
for the finding that decreases in corruption will increase investment in a country and per capita gross domestic product.  See 
also Id., at n. 42 (describing various studies concluding that there is a positive relationship between foreign investment and 
growth; and also discussing corruptions tendency to distort institution, prevent development, and undermine reform).   
32
  For a detailed discussion of the typology of corrupt organizations and organizations filled with corrupt actors, see Jonathan 
Pinto et. al, Corrupt Organizations or Organizations of Corrupt Individuals?  Two Types of Organization-Level Corruption, 
33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 685 (2008).  
10 
 
trust networks or traditional bank loans.  These sorts of barriers to investment have collectively been 
called an SME financing gap.
33
  
Furthermore, this constraint also serves to separate the businesses from key external stakeholders 
who can act as drivers of organizational growth, such as potential foreign equity-stake shareholders.  In 
other words, the negative influence of the business ethics problem of corruption creates a barrier to 
accessing outside investors and Foreign Direct Investment because the companies remain small and 
without the proper governance structures to provide outside investors with sufficient confidence to 
trigger investment and, consequently, real growth.
34
  In effect, a situation is created whereby companies 
appear to be poor investments because they lack the proper corporate governance structures to combat 
corruption or to protect the interests of minority shareholders.  In a broad sense, this glass ceiling can 
also be seen as a barrier to SMEs and family enterprises in the developing world to achieving parity with 




Traditionally, the glass ceiling metaphor refers to an invisible barrier to advancement in the 
workplace for minority groups.  For example, women were, historically, disparately treated by a 
predominantly male managerial force and faced an unofficial barrier to career advancement.  This so-
called glass ceiling was said to be a constraint on their acquiring management positions and pay equality 
with their male counterparts.  The glass aspect of the metaphor is important because those trapped 
beneath the ceiling can see the goal and path to advancement, but the transparent constraint restricts that 
advancement.  The metaphor of a glass ceiling has been used most often in the context of employment 
constraints for women, but it has been expanded to apply to other groups.
36
  
                                                 
33
  For an extensive global review of the SME financing gap for SMEs in developing countries, see ORGANISATION FOR 
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE SME FINANCING GAP, supra note 16. 
34
  An assumption here is that organizational growth – as in the broad sense meant here to include greater sophistication, 
increased revenues, employee size, and diversification of ownership – is both preferred by SMEs and FOEs and is a 
normative goal of these organizations.  Evidence of this assumption regarding the value and desirability of growth is further 
discussed in Section III, B, below.  Support for the conclusion that SME growth with the aid of better financing is an 
aspiration for these entities is found in the thrust of research and assistance of multilateral development organizations, such as 
the OECD (see, Id.) and for local government-sponsored SME support organizations such as the SME support initiatives of 
the Ministry of Economy and Trade of Lebanon focused on providing access to financing and streamlining SME-related legal 
procedures (see SME Programme, http://www.economy.gov.lb/MOET/English/Panel/Projects/Pages/SME.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2010)). 
35
 For example, less developed countries tend to rank lower on the Corruption Perceptions Index.  See generally 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2009 (2009). 
36
 See, e.g., Jeff Frank, Gay Glass Ceilings, 73 ECONOMICA 485 (2006) (expanding the glass ceiling analysis to lesbians, 
gays, and bisexuals in UK higher education); and Brinck Kerr et. al, An Unconventional Application of the Glass Ceiling 
Concept:  African American and Latino Administrators in Municipal Government Bureaucracies, 1987-1997, 32 PUB. 
ADMIN. Q. 491 (2008) (expanding the glass ceiling concept to examine the integration of ethnic minorities in government 
leadership positions).  
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While the glass ceiling metaphor in the academic literature has been confined largely to the 
examination of constraints on the labor market, it is a potentially powerful symbol for other similar 
constraints on advancement in the marketplace for organizations.  This paper, thus, applies the metaphor 
to a new subject area: ethics failings in the business world.  This is because the glass ceiling notion 
carries with it connotations of an invisible, yet confining, barrier to a group – or, in this case, a type of 
business entity – in search of rising within the ranks of its cohort.  Even if it is an imperfect symbol for a 
constraint on SME and family business growth, the glass ceiling nonetheless is a useful way to envision 
an often-overlooked constraint on growth, organizational advancement, and access to financing.  The 
metaphor is co-opted with an acknowledgment that its original context differs from the business 
organization and employment setting, but also with the understanding that the symbolism of the glass 
ceiling is a thought-provoking way to model the hidden and destructive impact of succumbing to the 
pressures of corruption. 
A model of how this glass ceiling develops and operates is comprised of three sets of factors:  1. 
weak corporate governance, and related ineffectual legal rules and insufficient enforcement; 2. social 
and cultural factors; and, 3. underdeveloped political and economic institutions.  Figure 1, below, is a 
pictorial representation of the interplay of these forces.  This section continues with a discussion of these 
pillars of the proposed business ethics glass ceiling model, with a focus on the issue of corporate 
governance.  Later, in Part IV, this model is applied to SMEs and small and medium-sized family 
businesses in the Middle East to illustrate how corporate governance reform is crucial to eliminating, or 
















Fig. 1:  Theoretical Model: Factors Contributing 
to the Ethics Glass Ceiling
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B. Legal and Corporate Governance Factors  
The corporate governance systems of more developed countries have evolved a series of 
relatively effective self-regulatory mechanisms to address the problem of corruption, including those 
related to transparency, accountability, and equity among shareholders.  The significant regulations and 
developed judicial systems of these countries force companies to adapt and improve their corporate 
governance structures.  By contrast, many emerging markets, including those in the Middle East, have 
less developed governance systems that are susceptible to exploitation by corrupt individuals inside the 
company, as well as from public officials seeking bribes.  It is this exploitation that contributes to the 
formation of the ethics glass ceiling constraint.  This section briefly enumerates the variety of legal and 
corporate governance that exist to help later explain how these elements when underdeveloped in 
emerging markets can contribute to the business ethics glass ceiling. 
The term corporate governance in this context refers to the internal business rules as well as the 
related laws that establish and promote the management and ownership rights and responsibilities of 
managers and owners (shareholders) of businesses.  In addition, ―[c]orporate governance describes the 
structures, processes, and institutions within and around organizations that allocate power and resource 
control among participants,‖ including the necessary legal and regulatory frameworks.
37
  Originally a 
narrowly construed notion of the relationship between a firm‘s suppliers of capital and the firm‘s top 
managers, the concept of corporate governance has expanded and now includes the interrelated rights 
and responsibilities of a range of stakeholders.
38
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 Gerald F. Davis, New Directions in Corporate Governance, 31 ANNU. REV. SOCIAL. 143, 143 (2005).  Certainly other, 
more detailed definitions exist – most in the context of large, publicly traded corporations.  For example: 
 
Investors in corporations require assurances that their contributions – financial capital, human capital, 
social capital – will generate a return.  Corporate governance concerns the institutions that make these 
investments possible, from boards of directors, to legal frameworks and financial markets, to broader 
cultural understandings about the place of the corporation in society.  Thus, corporate governance consists 
of ―the whole set of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded 
corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercises, and how the risks and returns from 
the activities they undertake are allocated.‖ 
 
Id. citing MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL:  RE-THINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 3 (1995). 
38
  The evolving scope of corporate governance means that it ―is more than simply the relationship between the firm and its 
capital providers.‖  On the contrary: 
 
Corporate governance also implicates how the various constituencies that define the business enterprise 
serve, and are served by, the corporation. Implicit and explicit relationships between the corporation and its 
employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, host communities - and relationships among these constituencies 
themselves - fall within the ambit of a relevant definition of corporate governance. As such, the phrase calls 
into scrutiny not only the definition of the corporate form, but also its purposes and its accountability to each 




Corporate governance can be influenced and imposed both internally and externally.  Internal 
governance concerns the self-regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation, while external 
governance comes from the legal and regulatory framework, as well as market forces, which impact the 
organization from the outside.
39
  Before this section discusses the negative externalities of weak 
corporate governance, it first presents the various forms and situations in which corporate governance 
arises. 
 There are several external influences on corporate governance.  These can be categorized as 
standards imposed at the country level and those that are found in pan-national guidelines.  Within those 
categories, there are legal and regulatory guidelines and multi-lateral conventions, as well as the 
potential for market forces, which impact the formation of corporate governance policies.  At the 
country level, indigenous corporate governance laws exist that serve the interests of that particular 
nation and its business organizations.  For instance, in the United States, the advent of the Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) legislation in 2002
40
 was designed to greatly impact the corporate governance of public 
companies.  The law was enacted following the accounting scandals, which came to light in 2001 and 
ushered in increased involvement of Congress in the traditionally state-regulated realm of corporate 
governance.
41
  Another example of corporate governance-influencing legislation is the U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),
42
 first enacted in 1977.  In contrast to SOX, the FCPA directly address a 
business ethics issue in that it criminalizes overseas bribery by U.S. businesses.
43
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Michael Bradley et. al, Challenges to Corporate Governance: the Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in 
Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9, 10-11 (1999). 
39
  Klaus J. Hopt, Globalisation of Corporate Governance: The Difficult Process of Bringing about European Union Internal 
and External Corporate Governance Controls in GLOBALISATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS (Karl Homan et. al , eds.) (2007). 
40
  Sarbanes-Oxley, UNITED STATES PUB. L. NO. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
41
  Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, New Standards of Director Loyalty and Care in the Post-Enron era: 
Are some Shareholders more Equal than Others?, 28 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 279, 279-80 (2004). The SOX 
legislation, in addition, has a specific component addressing the ethics failings, which Congress blamed for precipitating the 
economic losses.  An explicit piece of legislation concerning ethics-promotion is found in Section 406 of SOX, which 
requires that covered corporations to disclose if they have an ethics code for top management, as well as any waivers of the 
code provisions and, if not, to explain why such a code is not in place. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, UNITED STATES PUB. L. 
NO. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 §406(a), 15 U.S.C. §7264(a).  For a discussion of the business ethics content and implications of 
SOX, see David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1781 (2007). 
42
 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, PUB. L. 95-213 (1977) (enacted). 
43
 The FCPA was proposed following findings that many prominent U.S. multinational corporations had participated in 
corruption abroad. At that time a Securities and Exchange Commission report ―revealed corrupt foreign payments by over 
300 U.S. corporations involving hundreds of millions of dollars.‖ Senate Report of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Committee, S. REP. 95-114 (1977) at 3. In certain situations, government regulatory schemes and self-regulatory institutions 
might also influence corporate governance.  The obvious example of an agency that addresses corporate governance is the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  The SEC‘s mandate to regulate the purchase or sale of 
publically-traded securities brings with it corporate governance rules with an ethical outcome aimed at benefiting 
stakeholders or fostering market transparency.  These include requirements for public companies to disclose insider 
transactions under Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, UNITED STATES PUB. 
L. NO. 107-204, 116 Stat. 788, amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Section 16(a)). or to produce certain audit reports 
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 Externally imposed or influenced corporate governance may also come from self-regulatory 
organizations, such as industry groups or public exchanges with which a corporation is affiliated.  An 
overtly ethics-based influence on corporate governance would be the requirement that a corporation 
adopt an ethics code in order for it to remain in good standing with a stock exchange.  The New York 
Stock Exchange‘s requirement that its listed companies have an ethics code is an example of this 
external dictation of specific corporate governance structures related to business ethics.
44
 
In addition, there are corporate governance concepts that traditionally arise from state law.  For 
instance, there are well established common law duties of loyalty and care, as well as good faith, for 
board members and officers in U.S. jurisdictions.
45
  A governance-related concept such as the business 
judgment rule is another instance of a legal rule that sets the boundaries for corporate action by boards 
and influences how a board conducts a company‘s affairs.  In U.S. business organization‘s law, this is, 
perhaps, most associated with the business-friendly rules contained in the Delaware Limited Liability 
Company Act and Delaware General Corporation Law and related Delaware common law. 
 Market forces are another influence on corporate governance mandates originating outside of a 
corporation.  One example is the changes to corporate governance enacted by corporations, albeit 
internally, in reaction to a renewed rise in hostile takeovers in the 1980s.
46
  In those instances corporate 
boards of directors initiated changes to corporate governance rules, such as establishing takeover 
defenses, in response to market trends.
47
  Other market forces may influence corporate governance 
changes such as decisions to take a public company private, modify the composition of the board of 
directors, or even address executive compensation through changes related to the authorization to grant 
stock options.  There is, as might be expected, considerable debate in academic circles about the 
propriety of specific governance approaches and theories.
48
     
                                                                                                                                                                         
or quarterly and annual reports (Section 13 and 15(d) of the SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934). In effect, the trade off for 
being a publically traded company includes having to adopt some heightened governance mechanisms related to transparency 
and accountability that private companies might not otherwise voluntarily assume. 
44
  NYSE Euronext, Corporate Governance Standards:  Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, NYSE EURONEXT LISTED 
COMPANY MANUAL, §303A.10 (2009). 
45
  See Muir & Schipani, supra note 41, at 290-91 (―The concept of fiduciary duty, as applied to corporate officers and 
directors, is a significant part of corporate law jurisprudence. It is well established that corporate officers and directors owe 
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.  The most salient duties are the duties of care and loyalty, set against 
the obligation to act in good faith‖).  Id.  
46
  For a review of hostile takeovers as an influence on corporate governance, see Larry E. Ribstein, Imagining Wall Street, 1 
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 165, 168-78 (2006).  See also Timothy J. Vogus & Gerald F. Davis, Elite Mobilizations for Antitakeover 
Legislation, 1982-1990, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATION THEORY (Gerald F. Davis et. al, eds.) (2005) (finding 
that, among other factors, the collaboration of networked corporate elites accounts for the proliferation of corporate 
antitakeover legislation across the US in the 1980s). 
47
  See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 46. 
48
  For a discussion of some of the current debates underpinning corporate governance theory, see Martin Gelter, The Dark 
Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 
50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129 (2009). 
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Corporate governance guidance has also increasingly come from multilateral organizations.  In 
the last few decades, numerous model international corporate governance codes
49
 have been devised and 
promoted by multilateral organizations like the United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).
50
  These corporate governance codes are paralleled by numerous 
model business ethics codes and principles, such as the Caux Roundtable Principles for Business (1994; 
2009)
51
, the Sullivan Principles (1997),
52
 and the Social Accountability 8000 international standard 
(2001).
53
  Among those documents are also included programs that specifically address the prominent 
business ethics concern of corruption, such as the guidelines and business behavior accepted by 
signatories to the UN Global Compact and its Principle 10, Anti-corruption (2000),
54
 based on the UN‘s 
Convention Against Corruption
55
 and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (1997).
56
   
By design, these documents are intended to provide guidance to large organizations, in most 
cases publically-held or multinational entities.  While the generalized principles in these documents are 
applicable to entities of all sizes and ownership composition, they do not necessarily apply without 
caveat to small and medium-sized family businesses which conduct the bulk of the world‘s business 
activity,
57




                                                 
49
  For example, it is estimated that approximately forty national or international corporate governance codes relevant to the 
European Union have been adopted since the 1990s.  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Corporate 
Governance Sector Assessment Project, REPORT ON 2003 ASSESSMENT RESULTS 5 (2004).   
50
  The most influential set of corporate guidelines is perhaps the OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION GOVERNANCE (2004), 
which is endorsed by Transparency International as a tool for addressing corruption. 
51
 Caux Roundtable‘s Principles for Business are available at:   http://www.cauxroundtable.org/index.cfm?&menuid=8 (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
52
 Global Sullivan Principles of Social Responsibility, , http://www.thesullivanfoundation.org/gsp/principles/gsp/default.asp 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
53
 The 2008 version is available at: http://www.sa-intl.org/_data/n_0001/resources/live/2008StdEnglishFinal.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2010). 
54
 United Nations, Global Compact Against Corruption, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/Issues/transparency_anticorruption/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
55
 United Nations, Convention Against Corruption, 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
56
 OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and Related 
Documents, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf  (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
57
  See Laura J.  Spence & Robert Rutherfoord, Small Business and Empirical Perspectives, 47 J. BUS. ETHICS 1, 1 (2003). 
58
  There are two broad observations about these guidelines:  they are not tailored to small, medium and family businesses, 
and they are not scalable to fit those organizations.  In other words, the model codes do not address issues of business size 
and simplicity.  First, these guidelines are crafted for larger, multinational enterprises with a diverse ownership base and are 
of limited value for small and medium-sized family businesses.  They are also most applicable to multinational corporations 
and not small localized businesses, which dominate developing economies. While this critique that certain governance 
propositions are not well-suited for SMEs and most family businesses may be levied on model codes of corporate 
governance, the same critique is true for other forms of external governance influences.  Essentially, much of the purpose of 
corporate governance reforms is to promote transparency and accountability, yet those values are not always appropriate for 
16 
 
The recent proliferation of model corporate governance and ethics codes in developed countries 
has also been seen in developing countries.
59
  In the Middle East there have been at least two completed 
country-specific attempts to produce a corporate governance code, in Lebanon
60
 and in Egypt,
61
 with 
similar documents prepared for other jurisdictions.
62
  In addition, codes of ethics have also been 
somewhat popular in the Middle East, as elsewhere in the world.  MENA stock exchanges or trade 
associations, such as with the Lebanese Businessmen Association‘s Code of Business Ethics (2004), 
sometimes develop these codes,
63
 much like the better-known guidelines introduced by American stock 
exchanges.
64
   
Another potential source of pressure to develop, maintain, and improve corporate governance 
and ethics comes from outside financiers.  For instance, sources of capital such as banks will insist on an 
appropriate level of transparency that allows them to adequately evaluate the risk of a loan and the value 
of collateral.  Other such investors, who are more closely associated with developed markets, are equity 
investors, including venture capital investment firms.
 65
  However, simple equity investors who may 
wish to invest in a business by purchasing a fractional ownership stake, but remain in a passive role, are 
also examples of outside financiers. 
The impetus to modify or strengthen corporate governance can also come from within the 
business organization.  This internal influence on corporate governance comes from stakeholders, 
including shareholders, and (perhaps less likely) employees, made in response to other external changes.  
Notably, these are examples of voluntarily adopted, internally-driven corporate governance choices.  
However, the most influential factor consistently driving internal governance is the interests of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
SMEs and particularly family businesses where, with these closely-held companies, the audience for information tends to be 
owners, who are simultaneously insiders. 
Moreover, such top down, global north-originating attacks on corruption in developing economies risk seeming 
didactic and imperialistic.  For a discussion of the cross-cultural moral implications of corruption control approaches in the 
law and ethics literature, see generally, Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery:  The Moral Imperialism Critiques, 18 MINN. 
J. INT‘L L. 155 (2009). 
59
 See European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, supra note 49. 
60
 ABDELSATER-ABUSAMRA & BISHARA, supra note 26. 
61
 EGYPT CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS (October 2005) (English Translation),   
http://www.hawkamah.org/publications/codes/files/egyptiancodeofcorporategovernance_eng.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
62
  See Hawkamah and International Finance Corporation, A Corporate Governance, A Corporate Governance Survey of 
Listed Companies and Banks Across the Middle East & North Africa, 13 n. 8 (2008). 
63
  See, e.g, LEBANESE BUSINESSMEN ASSOCIATION (RDCL), CODE OF BUSINESS ETHICS (2004) (English translation)   
http://www.rdcl.org.lb/CodeofEthicsText.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
64
 See, e.g, NYSE Euronext, supra note 44. 
65
  See Hawkamah and International Finance Corporation, supra note 62, at 12 (arguing for the importance of corporate 
governance controls and improvements in the Middle East by citing evidence from various regions, as well as Egypt and 
Morocco from MENA, that well-governed companies are preferred by investors, who are willing to pay up to a 30% 





  For small and medium-sized enterprises and family businesses internally-derived 
governance decisions are a particularly important management tool.  Unlike large public companies 
where a baseline of corporate governance may be somewhat standardized or as dictated by legal 
requirements, SMEs and family businesses have more freedom to develop a personalized model that fits 
their needs.   
Similarly, the protection of minority shareholders‘ rights is especially an issue for SMEs and 
family businesses because functions of ownership and corporate control are so closely linked.  For 
example, because the distance between ownership and control is relatively short and there are only a few 
shareholders within these organizations, an incoming minority shareholder is able to negotiate 
governance protections, such as buy-out provisions or a guaranteed spot on the company‘s Board of 
Directors.  Even shareholders in large, publically-traded firms can positively influence the corporate 
governance and socially responsible choices of the companies they own.  One example of this influence 
is recent efforts from members of the Rockefeller family to push for an emphasis on environmental 
responsibility through corporate governance changes at oil giant ExxonMobil.
67
  Another emergent 
phenomenon related to shareholder salience, which is now entering the mainstream,
68




 Even with all of the best practices in place, legal and corporate governance safeguards will not 
ensure ethical behavior on the part of every corporation or its internal stakeholders.
70
  Nonetheless, the 
pro-ethics aspects of these various influences – both external and internal – will encourage ethical 
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 See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of 
Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 105 (1985) (―the separation of strategic and operational 
decisionmaking authority, which occurs in the multidivisionalized firm, serves to motivate senior managers toward the 
pursuit of shareholder interests as they are removed from operating responsibilities‖). 
67
  Rockefellers Demand Exxon Corporate Governance Reform, FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008.  Media reports detailed 
how representatives of ―ExxonMobil's longest-continuous shareholder,‖ the Rockefeller family, ―called a news conference in 
New York to question the company's past environmental policies and to press for corporate governance reforms, including an 
independent chairman and a stronger board.‖  The family was quoted as saying: 
 
After years of working behind the scenes to encourage Exxon's management to approach its industry 
challenges in new ways, members of the Rockefeller family will publicly explain the concerns held by 
multiple generations of their family. A majority of the family is now so concerned about the direction of 




  David Hess, The Three Pillars of Corporate Social Reporting as New Governance Regulation:  Disclosure, Dialogue and 
Development, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 447, 447 (2008). 
69
  See Id. at 453-456 (discussing the history and current state of corporate social reporting). 
70
  Ethics scholars have noted that infamous ethical lapses like those at Enron were cultivated among the company‘s 
management despite Enron‘s comprehensive ethics code.  Linda Klebe Trevino, Symposium: Corporate Misbehavior By Elite 
Decision-Makers Symposium: Perspectives From Law And Social Psychology: Out Of Touch: The CEO's Role In Corporate 
Misbehavior, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2005) (―We have now seen that senior executives influence the characteristics 
of formal ethics management. Yet creating a formal ethics or legal compliance program, by itself, does not guarantee 
effectiveness. Recall that Enron had an ethics code and other aspects of a formal program‖).  
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decision making among board members, managers, and other employees.  Weak governance structures 
related to recordkeeping and accounting practices also create a situation ripe for corruption and other 
ethical violations.  If a firm‘s finances are not transparent to its shareholders, then there is more room for 
unethical payments to be made to corrupt officials.  This situation of weak governance also allows for 
other instances of fraud or unethical actions taken within the company‘s finances that favor certain 
insiders.  An example of this would be preferential loans to officers, as in the case of Tyco, or outright 
hiding of losses, as was the case with Enron‘s off-book partnerships.
71
  
 Finally, the role of weak corporate governance in any of these aforementioned aspects will have 
a negative spillover on the ethical decision making of the firm, thus aiding in setting up an ethics 
constraint on the growth of the business.  More crucial to the creation of the business ethics glass ceiling 
is the instance where the positive spillovers of these influences are absent.  In other words, weak 
corporate governance can have important implications for ethical lapses.  For example, prior to the 
enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to address bribery of foreign officials by U.S. 
firms, the United States Department of Justice conducted an infamous survey, which found that over 300 
U.S. firms admitted to paying bribes in the 1970s.
72
  This situation can be traced to a corporate 
governance and ethics failure in that, prior to the FCPA, U.S. companies did not keep accurate records 





C. Social and Cultural Factors   
 The business ethics glass ceiling constraint can also, in part, come from social and cultural 
factors, both from within the firm and from outside.  Corruption, for instance, may be more tolerated by 
the owners and managers of a family business because of their focus on profit making, assumptions 
about the pervasiveness of graft, or perhaps a failure of an ethics-based leadership at the firm.
74
  
Multinational companies (MNCs), which are most often the focus of corruption and governance 
research, may succumb to corruption because individuals in the organization want to maximize short-
                                                 
71
 A brief recount of these and other high-profile corporate frauds is found in Howard Rockness & Joanne Rockness, 
Legislated Ethics: From Enron to Sarbanes-Oxley, the Impact on Corporate America, 57 J. BUS. ETHICS 31 (2005). 
72
  SENATE REPORT OF THE BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, S. Rep. 95-114, 3 (1977).  Specifically, a 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) report ―revealed corrupt foreign payments by over 300 U.S. corporations 
involving hundreds of millions of dollars.‖ Following numerous hearings on the scandal, a Senate report concluded that a 
―strong antibribery law is urgently needed to bring these corrupt practices to a halt and to restore public confidence in the  
integrity of the American business system.‖ Id. at 4. 
73
  See, e.g., FCPA and related discussion, supra note 43.   
74
  For a discussion of the role of a company‘s leadership in setting the proper ethical example, see generally, Mark S. 
Schwartz et. al, Tone at the Top: An Ethics Code for Directors?, 58 J. BUS. ETHICS 79 (2005). 
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term gains and fear they will not be able to compete without engaging in bribery.  In other words, MNCs 
may conclude that, while they prefer not to pay a bribe, they feel compelled to do so in order to avoid 
losing business opportunities.  The same reasoning applies to SMEs because those entities also do not 
want to take a stand and risk losing opportunities or becoming an example of an outlying organization 
targeted by corrupt officials to serve as a warning for other companies. 
There may be a prevailing sense in the international business community that corruption is 
endemic in many cultures and paying bribes is an essential and inevitable cost of doing business in 
certain parts of the world.
75
 The most significant cost associated with international bribery may be the 
impact on the government and deprived citizens,
76
 however there is also an immense impact on 
corporations, particularly multinationals operating in developing countries.
77
  This may also be fueled by 
sentiments that some firms are eager to pay bribes to secure an advantage over rivals and that firms that 
are unwilling to pay a bribe may lose business opportunities.
78
  Accordingly, ethics and family 
enterprise scholars have worked to develop universal ethics guidelines and tools for corporations that 
work in multiple cultural settings in an attempt to transcend local customs and expectations.
79
 
From the perspective of SMEs and FOEs in developing countries, pervasive corruption can also 
be an accepted fact of life and an assumed, albeit lamentable, business reality.  This leads to feelings of 
hopelessness in the face of corruption and provokes a reaction whereby the businesses in developing 
countries do not want to risk taking a stand against corruption.  Essentially, this is evidence of a 
collective action problem because, in the aggregate, small businesses could unite in a powerful common 
                                                 
75
  Evidence of this sort of public sentiment is found in Transparency International‘s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, 
supra note 35, which surveys various decision makers, including international investors, about the level of perceived 
corruption in individual countries.  See also Spahn, supra note 58 (discussing cultural imperialism concerns when developed 
world businesses and government impose anti-corruption rules on developing countries). 
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 Hess & Dunfee supra note 20, at 596. 
77
 See, e.g., Control Risks Group, Ltd. & Simmons & Simmons, International Business Attitudes to Corruption – Survey 2006 
(2006) at 5 (a recent consulting report on global corruption attitudes of multinationals revealed that 43% or the firms 
surveyed believed that they lost business to a competitor because the competitor paid a bribe).  See also 
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78
  For instance, a recent consulting report on global corruption attitudes of multinationals revealed that 43% or the firms 
surveyed believed that they lost business to a competitor because the competitor paid a bribe.  Control Risks Group Ltd. & 
Simmons & Simmons, supra note 77, at 5. 
79
  See, e.g., Kenneth E. Goodpastor, The Caux Round Table Principles:  Corporate Moral reflection in a Global 
Environment, in GLOBAL CODES OF CONDUCT:  AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME (Oliver F. Williams, ed.), 183-195 (2000) 
(―The aspiration of the Caux Principles, and the Minnesota Principles before them, was to articulate a comprehensive set of 
ethical norms that could be embraced by businesses operating internationally and in multiple cultural environments‖). at 184.  
Another example of a business ethics theoretical system which addresses cross-cultural decision making is the Integrative 
Social Contracts Theory developed by Professors Donaldson & Dunfee.  See generally, DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 
12, at 213-233. 
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opposition to corruption, but coordinating that effort and overcoming the fear of risking individual 
corporate opportunities is difficult. 
There are also social and cultural expectations in some regions where nepotism, and personal and 
family connections, are integral and accepted ways of business advancement.  Examples of this 
phenomenon include the cultural concepts of guanxi
80
 in China and wasta
81
 in the Middle East (which is 
discussed in Part IV).
82
  In addition other cultural influences may encourage ethical business practices.  
For instance, in the MENA region some banks and business may be required by law or religious 
conviction to adhere to Islamic lending practices which must adhere to a prohibition on charging 
interest, known as riba.
83
  Rooted in religious doctrine, this prohibition may make it difficult to access 
capital in ways expected by Western firms, but riba can also be viewed as an ethical practice, which 




D. Political and Economic Factors   
 The business ethics glass ceiling is also influenced by the political and economic situation 
surrounding businesses. This is because a lack of political will to curb corruption or, worse, a political 
culture that facilitates corruption and a poor economy can contribute to business ethics failings as a 
constraint on business growth.
85
 
 In terms of the economic situation of a region, there are indications that corruption increases 
during economic downturns, such as during the current global recession.
86
  Countries that have suffered 
recent society-wide violence such as a civil war are also susceptible to corruption,
87
 including within 
industries such as construction during a post-war rebuilding.
88
  A brief look at the Transparency 
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  See Danielle E. Warren et. al, Social Exchange in China: The Double-Edged Sword of Guanxi, 55 J. BUS. ETHICS 355 
(2004). 
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  See CUNNINGHAM & SARAYRAH, infra, note 151.  
82
  For a comparison of the two concepts, see Hutchings & Weir, infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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  See Mohammad H. Fadel, Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential regulation:  Preliminary Thoughts, 25 WIS. INT'L L.J. 655 
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Interpretive Communities and the Origins of Islamic Finance, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 249, 262-63 (2008) (discussing the origins 
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  See Ala Hamoudi, supra note 83, at 262-263 (discussing the negative Quar‘anic connotations of riba, including equating 
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209-224. 
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2009 Transparency International study on leading exporters and the incidence of corruption). 
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   See, e.g., Daniel Large, Introductory Survey: Corruption and Reconstruction After War in from CORRUPTION IN POST 
WAR RECONSTRUCTION:  CONFRONTING THE VICIOUS CYCLE, 32-55 (2005).  See also, Vera Devine, Corruption in Post-War 
Reconstruction:  The Experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Id. at 81-96; and Charles Adwan Corruption in Reconstruction:  
the Cost of ‘National Consensus’ in Post-war Lebanon Id. at 56-80 (discussing the rise of rampant corruption during the 
postwar reconstruction of Lebanon following the 1975-1990 conflict). 
88
  See Devine; and Adwan, Corruption in Reconstruction, supra note 87. 
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International annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) shows that poor countries in the developing 
world tend to have higher levels of perceived corruption.
 89
  Moreover, corruption has been cited as both 
a cause of poverty, as well as a byproduct.
90
  High levels of perceived corruption cataloged in the CPI 
have even been correlated to violence within a society.
91
  In addition, the annual World Bank Doing 
Business
92
 reports contain aggregate country rankings on a country‘s business environment, which 
capture rule of law and business regulation indicators.  These reports demonstrate that, again, poor 
countries in the developing world tend to fare poorly in the rankings as compared to developed nations.   
Another political and economic influence on the business ethics glass ceiling and corruption is 
the public sector demand side for bribes.  In this instance, a lack of effective enforcement and weak 
political will to fight corruption creates an environment ripe for bribe-asking, particularly in developing 
regions like the Middle East where entrenched political interests support corruption and associated ills 
such as nepotism.
93
  Ironically, during political and economic shocks that are experienced by many 
developing nations SMEs and family businesses are integral to stabilizing society and business.
94
  
However, it is at those times that these businesses are least insulated from corruption and other 
challenges to organizational-level business ethics.  This situation, in turn, increases the likelihood of a 
glass ceiling to growth for SMEs and family businesses facing corruption because businesses wish to 
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  See Rajib N. Sanyal & Subarna K. Samanta, Determinants of Bribery in International Business, 46 THUNDERBIRD INT‘L 
BUS. R. 133 (2004). 
90
  See, e.g., Transparency International, Working Paper No. 2/2008: Poverty and Corruption 2 (2008). 
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[Lebanese] political class‖ for creating and failing to fight corruption and for the problem of rampant political nepotism).  
94
  For a comment on the destabilizing impact of corruption in the Middle East, see Id., stating: 
 
It‘s easy to moralize about the daily corruption that we see or hear about, but it‘s much more difficult to 
tackle the practical need for fighting corruption and enlarging the economic pie for everyone.   This is 
particularly true in a region where so many people are under the age of 25, and steadily and rapidly 
entering the job market. Providing jobs is simply critical for domestic stability, and stemming corruption is 
way to boost this stability. People need jobs and they should be provided before they‘re demanded; 




III. Corporate Governance, Business Ethics, and Stakeholders in Family SMEs 
 To fully understand the importance of the business ethics glass ceiling in the Middle East, it is 
first necessary to explain the role and significance of the dominant business model in the region:  small 
and medium family businesses.  The definitional parameters, importance, and the place of these 
businesses in the Middle East are discussed in this section. 
 
A. Defining SMEs and Small and Medium-Sized Family Businesses     
Family-owned enterprises (FOEs) are businesses that are owned primarily by individuals who 
are related, and thus have family ties that may influence the decision-making of the owners beyond the 
usual wealth-maximizing concerns of the typical shareholder.
95
   There is general agreement in the 
academic literature with the intuitive conclusion that family involvement in the business is the defining 
characteristic of a ―family business.‖
96
  Literally, a family enterprise is owned and controlled by 
members of the same nuclear or extended family.
97
  Many were started by one generation and have been 
passed down to the next, and perhaps onto successive generations.  
Family businesses may be large publically traded companies that are controlled by a family, 
although most are small and privately held.  In the aggregate, these entities have an enormous impact on 
a country‘s economy.  In the U.S., for example, some FOEs have grown far beyond being medium-
sized, such that a large percentage of Fortune 500 companies are individually or family-controlled.
98
  
This paper, however, is concerned with family enterprises that are also SMEs. While there are numerous 
definitions for what entities qualify, small and medium enterprises are usually defined with reference to 
the number of people they employ, although some measures include the company‘s finances as another 
indication of overall size relative to other enterprises.
99
  
                                                 
95
  Jess H. Chua et. al, Defining the Family Business by Behavior, 23 ENTREP. THEORY & PRAC. 4 (1999) (providing an 
extensive review of existing definitions of ―family business‖). 
96
  Id. 
97
 For greater detail on a definition of family businesses, see Peter Davis, Realizing the Potential of the Family Business, 12 
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 47 (1983).  In explaining what sorts of entities qualify as a family business Davis writes: 
 
Family businesses are those whose policy and direction are subject to significant influence by one or more 
family units.  This influence is exercised through ownership and sometimes through the participation of 
family members in management.  It is the interaction between two sets of organization, family and business, 
that establishes the basic character of the family business and defines its uniqueness.  Family and business 
combine to produce a joint system operating according to rules derived from the needs of separate parts but 
adapted to the needs of the whole. 
 
Id. at 47-48. 
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 Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries, The Dynamics of Family Controlled Firms: The Good and the Bad News, 21 
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 59, 61 (1993).  
99
 In the United States for instance, it is generally accepted that small businesses have between 0 (i.e., a sole proprietorship) 
and 19 employees, and medium-sized firms have between 20-499 employees, with large businesses having 500 or more 
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A typical SME (family owned or otherwise) might, particularly in the developed world, be 
organized as a corporation.  However, a family profit-generating enterprise could also be set up, if 
formally incorporated at all, as other entities such as a registered partnership, limited liability company, 
or joint-stock company.  In this analysis, the specific legal format is of little significance as long as there 
is a corporate governance structure consistent with the size of the entity.  Because of their small size 
SMEs are almost certainly not a ―listed‖ company, with its shares being made available to the public 
through a stock exchange.
100
 
These entities can also be understood by pointing out what they are not.  They are not large firms 
and, therefore, do not have the concerns associated with managing large numbers of diversely-employed 
workers, and they may not have to face certain regulations reserved for larger firms.  There is also the 
likelihood that they have a core business mission, rather than producing dozens of diverse products or 
providing services that cross cut industries.  Most importantly the ―distance‖ between owners, managers, 




B.  The Importance of Small and Medium Family Firms 
SMEs (whether or not they are family-owned) are crucial to a nation‘s economy.  First and 
foremost is the fact that, in both developed and developing nations, SMEs make important contributions 
to employment and to the economy as a whole.  As scholars arguing for a greater focus on the business 
ethics of small businesses have observed:  
                                                                                                                                                                         
employees. W. Mark Crain, SBA Office of Advocacy, Small Business Research Summary: The Impact of Regulatory Costs 
on Small Firms (2005).   The European Union‘s SME definition, established in 2003, provides that medium enterprises have 
fewer than 250 employees, small enterprises have fewer than 50 employees, and micro enterprises have fewer than 10 
employees, in addition to flexible financial ceilings. European Union, Definition of Small and Medium Enterprises (2003), 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/sme_definition/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).The European Union 
defines an ―enterprise‖ simply as ―any entity engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal form.‖  Id. at 12. 
100
  For an understanding of the corporate governance issues related to family SMEs the absolute preciseness of the definition 
of a small and medium enterprise or a family-owned enterprise is not crucial.  This is not, however, an argument for an 
amorphous, ―I know it when I see it,‖ case-by-case approach.  Rather, this paper is looking at the role and impact – and 
governance and ethical implications – of archetypal SMEs and family businesses that are also small or medium-sized.  There 
is, however, obvious overlap between SMEs and most family enterprises.  Many entities are both an SME and family-owned, 
and a given entity can also fit one definition, but not the other.  Most family-owned and controlled enterprises are not large 
enterprises, in part because large businesses usually have grown by selling proportional ownership rights, thus creating a 
large shareholder base beyond the family and trust networks with which to spread risk.   
101
  Finally, it should be noted that the above distinctions between types of firms are based on generalizations about the 
majority of firms.  The permutations of possible governance structures (and the attendant implications for business ethics) are 
numerous, as are the options with regard to size in terms of revenue or market power, number of employees, or ownership 
format.  A small family-owned company might technically be a multinational corporation because it operates in its home 
country as well as internationally with a small foreign office or staff.  Similarly, a large multinational corporation could still 
be owned, or at least controlled, by a single family. Prominent large family businesses include Cargill and Wal-Mart.  See, 
e.g., DANNY MILLER & ISABELLE LE BRETON-MILLER, MANAGING FOR THE LONG RUN: LESSONS IN COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE FROM GREAT FAMILY BUSINESSES (2005).  In reality, these are exceptions to the rule of how large or cross-
national companies evolve and grow in size to be competitive and benefit from economies of scale, as well as from the 
separation of ownership and control.  
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Even the most casual glance at the industrial statistics of developed countries clearly 
demonstrates that small business contribute around 50 per cent of private sector employment and 
account for between 96 and 99 per cent of business in OECD countries.  This sector is seen as the 




These small firms are an important source of economic growth in developing nations because 
SMEs, particularly as they grow, can also attract crucial capital inflows of Foreign Direct Investment.
103
  
Small businesses also have important societal impacts.  By some measurements, small and medium 
businesses contribute more to the public good than do larger businesses.  In the U.S., for instance, small 
(defined by having fewer than 20 employees), and particularly medium-sized (with 20-499 employees), 
businesses bear a disproportionately higher per employee federal regulatory burden than large 
businesses (500 or more employees).
104
   
In recent years, corporate social responsibility and business law scholars have also argued that 
business activity and economic growth are essential to peace, political stability, and human 
development.
105
  In general, these commentators maintain that multinational corporations have a 
significant role to play in this endeavor.
106
  However, if business is indeed a mediating institution that 
can provide moral knowledge (typically provided by family, neighborhoods, religious groups, or 
volunteer organizations),
107
 it follows that SMEs (and certainly small and medium family enterprises) 
and their potentially tight-knit work communities are also vehicles for such ethical knowledge transfer.   
From a purely practical standpoint, family businesses can serve as repositories of wealth for 
individuals desiring to place their capital somewhere relatively safe in hard assets.  This function may be 
particularly salient for indigenous investors in developing countries who want to take an active role in 
managing a business, but who otherwise might find it unsafe to keep their assets in local banks or in 
other local investments controlled by non-relatives outside of their trust networks.  Additionally, the 
Organisation for Co-operation and Development (OECD) has found a wealth of evidence of the so-
called SME financing gap, as compared to larger entities‘ abilities to raise capital.  As this report put it: 
Access to finance is regularly cited as the most serious obstacle, with little variation among 
regions of the developing world. An additional fact corroborating the positive correlation between 
firm size and the severity of the credit constraint is the ease of access to bank credit reported by 
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larger firms. According to [the World Bank‘s World Business Environment Survey] data, the 
share of bank credit as a percentage of total financing is systematically lower for SMEs [citation 
omitted]. Small firms rely proportionally more on non-bank sources of financing such as internal 




It is in the context of these existing obstacles the corruption constraint on growth adds yet another layer 
of barriers to accessing financing, although the role of corruption as an overlay to and cause of this 
situation is not usually discussed as such. 
 
C. Organizational Size and its Relationship to Business Ethics and Corporate Governance  
As a threshold issue, small and medium-sized business growth is adversely impacted by 
corruption, legal, and financing constraints.  In a leading study of these constraints on small and 
medium-sized firms, a group of World Bank economists found that each of these factors had a negative 
impact on the sales growth of SMEs around the world and the impact was greater in SMEs than larger 
entities.
109
  The study also concluded that improvement to local institutions and greater access to 
financing would have the greatest impact on SMEs.
110
 
An important difference between large and small businesses is the fact that small firms are likely 
to be owner-managed.
111
  In other words, one of the crucial features of large, public companies is the 
ability to tap into loaned capital by separating ownership (shareholders) and control (management).  A 
perceived lack of focus on small business ethics issues has been called a ―fundamental flaw‖ in existing 
ethics research.
112
  In terms of ethics implications, the fact that small firms are most likely owner-
managed ―provides greater scope for individual beliefs and moral decision making to affect the practices 
as a whole.  In addition, the social relationships and networks in which these owner managers are 
entwined cannot be separated from the business.‖
113
  Some research also suggests a relationship between 
increased firm size and the incidence of corporate crime.
114
 
 Large organizations tend to be more bureaucratic, and their success may even be tied, in part, to 
their ability to act impersonally as compared to a smaller, local company with a personal connection to a 
community.  For example, a large company might be more likely to make a decision to close a facility 
based only on a principle of profit-maximization, while a small, locally connected one would consider 
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the community as a stakeholder.
115
  A large enterprise may also subvert an individual‘s impulse to act in 
a socially responsible manner because those acts are inconsistent with the thrust of the organization‘s 
control systems.
116
  The difference in market power between large and small firms also creates an ironic 
situation where larger firms may have the resources to be socially responsible and the freedom to make 
ethical decision making a priority, but are constrained from doing so by shareholders‘ financial concerns 
and internal controls.  In contrast, small firms may lack the power to have a significant impact, even if 
they are more likely to want to act responsibly.
117
 
 In a family business, the core internal stakeholders are closely connected to one another and to 
the entity.
118
  Thus, from a corporate governance perspective, these organizations need internal 
management rules that serve their unique needs and address common stumbling blocks.  Because small 
and medium-sized organizations are compact in their management and ownership structure, there is 
often overlap between stakeholders such that the ethical treatment aspect inherent in stakeholder theory 
becomes strained.  For example, in a small family company, a single individual is likely to be, 
simultaneously, a shareholder, a manager, and an employee.  Moreover, in a family business, that person 
might be related by blood or married to another similarly situated stakeholder, thus complicating 
business relationships with existing familial loyalties or, perhaps, tensions. 
This closeness can be both an advantage and disadvantage to an organization.  For small FOEs 
these include benefits (compared to non-family-controlled businesses) such as the organization having 
greater independence of action because of less outside pressure, less bureaucratic (and thus more 
flexible and immediate) decision making, institutional knowledge and knowledge sharing, resilience, a 
long-term orientation, and the potential for great financial rewards.
119
   
However, the injection of family priorities and personalities into family businesses has potential 
disadvantages as compared to non-family firms.  These include financial issues such as difficulty in 
accessing capital, (which limits growth) and the potential for family members taking out 
disproportionately more resources from the company than they contribute.
120
  Other issues that impact 
family businesses include outside family disputes and rivalries spilling over into the organization‘s 
management, nepotism that may lead to poor management, succession uncertainty, and secretive and 
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  Moreover, the family business norm of nepotism runs 
counter to notions of fairness and equal treatment of stakeholders. 
It has been argued that in large organizations, such as large multinational corporations, 
decentralization of decision making is important for fostering ethical outcomes.
122
  This is, in part, 
because better ethical decisions may be made when there is trust among individuals and the decision 
maker in the organization is as close to the problem as possible.
123
  Moreover, other research suggests 
that interactions at work can fill the role of satisfying an individual‘s associational needs.
124
 
 In the case of small and medium family businesses, because, by definition, there are fewer 
possible decision makers than within large firms there is a reduced concern of top-heavy, disinterested, 
and morally-devoid decision making by disconnected managers.  Small businesses that are also family 
enterprises have the added benefit of not only having a short distance between problems and decision 
makers, but also the built-in community factor by being organized around individuals who are bound by 
familial ties.  Finally, as discussed below, many of the high-level governance best practices for large, 
publically traded corporations with a pronounced separation of ownership and management, and where 
financial transparency and accountability is paramount for shareholders and regulators, are inapplicable 
to small and medium family business. 
 
D.  Small and Medium-sized Family Enterprises in the Middle East 
 The majority of business and corporate entities in the Middle East and North Africa are family 
enterprises and SMEs.
125
  Accordingly, the scope and importance of the small and medium-sized family 
business sector in the Middle East is comparable to the role of those entities discussed above in other 
parts of the world.  Also of note is that in many MENA countries, including Lebanon, the utilities (such 
as electricity and most telecommunications companies) are still state-owned enterprises. Therefore, 
those potentially large private sector companies are exempted from market forces and exist outside of 
private sector corporate governance best practices.  While the Lebanese Ministry of Economy and Trade 
does not publish exact SME numbers on an ongoing basis, a Ministry-sponsored review reports that 
―Lebanon‘s private sector is highly dominated by small and medium enterprises, where enterprises 
employing less than five individuals make up as high as 88% of the total number of enterprises‖ and 
―[i]f enterprises of less than 200 employees are considered, then over 99% of Lebanese enterprises are 
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SMEs‖ and provide about half of the country‘s total employment.
126
  Other regional governance experts 
have estimated that 90% of the SMEs in Lebanon are individual or family-owned, and 85% of industrial 
companies have less than 10 employees.
127
  Compared to other regions MENA ―has some of the largest 
family-owned businesses in the world and a disproportionate number of privately held businesses.‖
128
 
 In the Middle East governance experts believe that improved governance ―should be viewed as a 
tool and investment for the MENA countries as they seek to raise economic growth rates, improve the 
wealth and prosperity of their citizens and improve the social and economic prospects of future 
generations.‖
129
  In Lebanon, for instance, there has been much focus in recent years on surveying SMEs 
and family businesses and creating initiatives addressing their needs.
130
 
Similarly, when it comes to business financing there are findings that inadequate access to 
capital is a significant problem for MENA businesses, as is a lack of entrepreneurial capacity, poor 
credit history, and a minimal track record of entities actually seeking financing.
131
  MENA SMEs also 
tend to have a record of poor regulatory reporting, ―confusion between the SME‘s assets and the assets 
of the entrepreneur,‖ and ―SME‘s business plans are not strategic but rather based on the specific goals 
or personal preferences of the entrepreneur (ie [sic] projects with low expected returns).‖
132
  As in other 
developing regions, there is evidence that an SME financing gap in the Middle East due to, among other 
factors, the failure to have corporate governance structures consistent with international norms.
133
  Also 
symptomatic of the region is a failure of private equity to fund SME growth or takeovers.
134
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Although it is not addressed as a discrete topic in this paper, the issue of religion and how 
religious ethics have implications for business activity external governance is also important in MENA 
business culture.
135
  The obvious example is the pervasive influence of Islamic thought and practice on 
business financing, to varying degrees, in the region.  For instance, Islamic financing constraints are 
relatively rare and would be voluntary in Lebanon, a country with a large Christian and significant 
secular Muslim population, but are mandated by law in religiously observant countries such as Saudi 
Arabia.  Even where Islam has an important influence on business ethics and practice, as in Egypt, there 
can be a split between ethical ideals and business practice based on the realities of economic life and 
individual hardship.
136
  Some religiously rooted obstacles to traditional Western-style financing, such as 
the well-known Islamic prohibition on charging interests on loans (known as riba),
137
 may also be 
problematic for family businesses because they cannot access capital markets to take on equity investors 
due to their modest size and lack of governance infrastructure. 
The business atmosphere and ―ease of doing business‖ in a given country is directly related to 
that country‘s legal framework and enforcement mechanisms – these include the ability to predictably 
enforce contracts, the number of procedures necessary to start a business, the ease of hiring and firing 
workers, and investor protections.
138
  With these rule of law barometers as a starting point Ian Ayres and 
Jonathan Macey have sharply critiqued the structural problems leading to economic stagnation in the 
Middle East.
139
  They argue that there are deep-rooted historical reasons and current political obstacles 
in the Middle East that serve to oppose the democratizing business forces that have taken hold in the 
West.  Specifically, they argue that despotic and entrenched Arab leaders have promoted bureaucratic 
and legal obstacles – including long incorporation processes, corrupt officials, and high initial capital 
requirements – that have stymied the rise of modern corporations in the Middle East.
140
  They also 
perceive a strong aversion in the Arab world to taking business risks because of the serious reputation 
injury in Arab culture that comes with failure.  Therefore, they argue, the all-important risk-taking spirit 
of the developed world, which is unleashed by widespread use of the corporate form, is largely absent 
from the MENA region.
141
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IV. The Ethical Glass Ceiling for Family Business in the Middle East, with a focus on Lebanon 
 
 This section builds on the theoretical framework of the business ethics glass ceiling and applies it 
to the corporate governance and ethics situation of businesses in the Middle East.  Following this initial 
discussion, several suggestions for changes to corporate governance in the region are presented, as well 
as a call for additional research into the area of corporate governance and ethics to address the problem 
of a business ethics glass ceiling constraining growth. 
 
A.  Corporate Governance and Business Ethics Shortcomings in the MENA Region 
The available legal frameworks in MENA related to reforms for good corporate governance have 
multiplied in recent years,
142
 but still do not guarantee the level of governance required for well-
managed and ethical organizations, including family businesses.  The international best practices 
contained in the model governance codes mentioned above are an important first step.
143
  However, the 
MENA economic historian Timur Kuran argues that ―transplanting a legal code or institution is not the 
same thing as appropriating the entire social system that produced it…[t]he performance of a legal code 
depends on the norms, other complementary institutions, and capabilities of the community putting it to 
use.‖
144
   
Other researchers have drawn the conclusion that, despite some gains due to governance reforms, 
the Middle East lags behind the developing world in terms of economic growth because of 
macroeconomic weaknesses.
145
  Corporate law scholars have also recently argued that institutional and 
systematic failings related to the discouraging of risk-taking through the use of the corporate form and 
limited liability has stifled economic growth and democratization in MENA.
146
  In explaining these 
problems they point to political opposition in the Middle East to the formation of small businesses 
because a successful middle class would jeopardize entrenched, autocratic political leaders who fear 
seeing their control diminished.
147
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143
  See, e.g., ABDELSATER-ABUSAMRA & BISHARA, supra note 26 (a Lebanon-specific MENA country code of corporate 
governance utilizing the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance).  
144
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  See Id. at 399, arguing that, despite the ease with which limited liability corporate forms could be allowed, ―[m]any 
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path of small-business creation.‖  In addition they argue that:  
31 
 
Consistent with that view, one study found that Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt are generally 
compliant in theory with OECD principles of good corporate governance, but deviate in practice.
148
  As 
one would expect, rule of law and property rights are important for family business growth and 
financing, and there is ―evidence that poor corporate governance (and underdeveloped financial and 
legal systems and higher corruption) means (a) the growth rate of the smallest firms is the most 
adversely affected and (b) less new, and particularly small firms, start up.‖
149
 
 However, in other MENA countries, for instance Lebanon, the corporate governance legal 
framework is not even on its face up to international best practices with regard to two crucial areas:  1. 
minority shareholder rights, and 2. fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty that can ameliorate 
conflicts of interests.  The details of this deficit in existing Lebanese corporate governance law and 
practice – and the impact it has on an ethics cap on business growth – are discussed in the next 
subsection. 
 Concepts of corporate governance, and for that matter good governance in general, are somewhat 
new to the Arab world.
150
  Also crucial to understanding the ethics and stakeholder interaction in the 
region is an Arab cultural phenomenon inherent in the close-knit family and sectarian culture of the 
Middle East called wasta.
151
  Wasta is a concept that defies easy translation, but is at its essence a notion 
of family obligation and nepotism or social power and influence.
152
  It is a form of socially obligatory 
nepotism bordering on family-centered corruption that becomes more clearly an issue when family 
members or others with close social ties are able to exercise their influence with public officials to 
achieve private gain.  One example of wasta rising to a level of corruption would include a government 
official exerting influence to ensure the hiring of a relative, despite stated guidelines for a system of 
merit-based hiring.  Another example of against the rule corruption is a scenario in which a public 
official grants special benefits (or looks the other way to avoid enforcement with an issue like tax 
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
under certain conditions prevalent in Middle Eastern politics, it would be irrational for the ruling coalitions to 
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collection) to close associates, to the detriment of other businesses or even specific business competitors.  
Because of wasta’s general acceptance in Arab culture, it is an important issue for SMEs, and 
particularly family businesses. 
 
B.  Case Study:  The Lebanese Corporate Governance Deficit 
     1. A Brief Cultural, Historical, and Business Background 
Located on the eastern-most edge of the Mediterranean Sea, Lebanon has historically existed at 
the intersection of Western and Eastern cultures, religions, and business practices.  It is a geographically 
tiny, Arabic-speaking Middle Eastern country with a population of approximately 4 million.
153
  As one 
author put it, ―Lebanon is cursed by its size. Its population of disparate identities, each harboring 
conflicting aspirations and fears, is trapped within the country‘s scant four thousand square miles.‖
154
  
The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) has been followed by relative calm and massive infrastructure 
reconstruction,
155
 although the summer 2006 conflict with Israel and perennial political instability, 
which reached a crescendo in 2007-08, have been setbacks to that rebuilding effort.   
 Unlike the Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) around the Persian Gulf with their oil-dependent 
economies, Lebanon‘s topography of sea and mountains is much like the coast of other Mediterranean 
nations.  It has traditionally been a nation of merchants, in part because of the central location and 
because the country is without natural resources like oil, although Lebanon is noteworthy among MENA 
nations for its significant amount of freshwater and sea access.  The Lebanese economy has become 
dependent on ―market services‖ such as banking, trade, manufacturing, and ―non-market services‖ such 




 The flood of international investment and aid that poured in at the conclusion of the Lebanese 
Civil War created a massive amount of infrastructure reconstruction projects, particularly in the Beirut 
Central Business District.
157
  Unfortunately, the influx of capital created an immense target for 
corruption with the innumerable transactions and government interactions related to construction 
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  See CIA World Factbook, Republic of Lebanon (2010), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
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  See Ministry of Economy and Trade statistics, 1997-2003, http://www.economy.gov.lb (last visited Mar. 1, 2010). 
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contracts and other allocations.
158
  Lebanon has also made efforts to comply with requirements to join 




In Lebanon, as in other parts of the developing the world, corruption poses a significant threat to 
economic growth.  Transparency International, the leading global anti-corruption NGO, ranks Lebanon 
as 130 of 180 countries in its most recent Corruption Perceptions Index, making it only ahead of Libya, 
Yemen, and Iraq within the overall low-ranking MENA region.
160
  In furtherance of the business needs 
and expediency, businesses end up greasing the wheels of government to obtain licenses or avoid taxes 
or fines.  As a result, these companies are trapped in a cycle of paying bribes for public services and 
bureaucratic actions which they are already entitled to under the law.  Although the financial cost of 
corruption is difficult to quantify because of its illicit nature, one NGO study found that, on average, 6% 
of the annual sales of Lebanese companies are spent on paying bribes.
161
  The suffocating impact of 




Compared to many of its regional neighbors, pre-war Lebanon had relatively sophisticated 
commercial laws and enforcement based mainly on the French civil law system.  However after the 
conflict Lebanon was left with a set of business laws that were up to date for the 1960s, but not 
modernized to deal with globalization best practices related to transparency and corruption.  Since the 
1990s and the end of the Lebanese Civil War, corporate governance reforms have taken place, 
particularly as applied to the banking sector and the ―on the books‖ regulation of the re-opened Beirut 
Stock Exchange.
163
  There are few Lebanese public companies; therefore there are a limited number of 
firms which would necessarily feel market pressure to be transparent and accountable.  There are only 
eleven companies listed on the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE): Solidere S.A.L. (I and II), the 
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reconstruction and development entity for the Beirut Central Business District, six banks, one trading 
company, and three industrial manufacturers, as well as two bond and investment funds.
164
  In total, 




The governing commercial law in Lebanon is the Lebanese Code of Commerce (LCC).
166
  
Regarding corporate governance, of note is the LCC‘s provision, from the French roots, for joint-stock 
companies with a unified Board of Directors headed by a Managing Director.  Company shares are, in 
theory, freely transferable, but there is personal liability for owners unlike in a registered corporation.  In 
this governance system there are no officers; rather, the board actively manages all the affairs of the 
corporation and is headed by a Managing Director who usually takes a primary management role and 
supervises employees. 
 
     2. Factors Creating a Business Ethics Glass Ceiling to Growth: Weak Governance and the Family  
        Business    
Consistent with the intent of this paper, the focus of this section is the role of corporate 
governance in improving business ethics and addressing corruption concerns.  While corporate 
governance is the unifying thread, the other factors of social and cultural influences and political and 
economic influences are integrated into the following discussion. 
There are several structural weaknesses and rigidities in the Lebanese corporate governance 
system that create disincentives for a family enterprise to adopt international best practices.  As argued 
later in this section, these weaknesses lead to a ―business ethics glass ceiling‖ that serves to stunt the 
growth of Lebanese companies.  Notably, the Lebanese Commercial Code does not contemplate the 
familiar developed world corporate governance feature of independent directors.  The LCC or Lebanese 
common law do not, on their own, implement the standard officers and directors duties present in 
international best practices (and assumed in the U.S. legal system).  Specifically, the one-tiered 
management structure of Lebanese companies places an emphasis on the management expertise of the 
Managing Director and the active directors.  Also of note, the LCC provides for several legal business 
entity formats, such as joint-stock companies (without limited liability for directors), limited liability 
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companies, and general partnerships,
 167
 but does not as yet provide for western-style corporations, 
marked by limited liability for managers and directors, tiered governance, separate ownership and 
control, and widely dispersed equity ownership.  Minority shareholder protections are lacking, even to 
the extent that the LCC provides for double voting power for shareholders of joint-stock companies who 
have held shares for at least two years.
168
 
However, in the Lebanese corporate governance system there are no ingrained fiduciary duties – 
including the duties of loyalty and fair dealing – and there are no corporate governance checks and 
balances on directors who choose to engage in detrimental insider transactions or disloyal dealing with 
competing enterprises.  The result, again, is that minority shareholders, including potential foreign 
investors interested in an equity stake in the enterprise, are potentially harmed.  Or, perhaps worse, these 
investors choose not to take a risk in investing in what would otherwise be attractive companies. 
Due in part to the inefficiencies of the corporate governance rules, Lebanon does poorly when it 
comes to attracting Foreign Direct Investment, even within a region that already struggles to attract 
FDI.
169
  Accordingly, a greater level of transparency, even with small and medium-sized family 
enterprises, is important for at least two reasons.  The first is that currently investors – both domestic and 
foreign – are hesitant to invest in Lebanese businesses because those companies often appear to be 
unprofitable and poorly run (whether that is true or not).  Because of the corrupt government officials, 
many Lebanese companies of all sizes prefer to appear as if they are losing money because it reduces the 
chance they will become a target for bribe-askers in the bureaucracy.  Showing a loss also allows for tax 
avoidance.  However, outside investors are unable to perceive any value in these companies and, thus, 
capital is withheld, and the companies‘ growth and development is artificially stunted below a 
corruption glass ceiling set by the bribe-takers.   
The second reason is that the long-term integrity of the entire system and investor confidence 
will benefit by shareholders and potential investors being able to view an accurate picture of Lebanese 
companies, for better or worse in the short term.  In other words, outside of the family inner circle, there 
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are not systems in place to allow for trust-building between the family enterprise and outside 
stakeholders, such as potential investors.  
That there is not a duty of loyalty requirement among stockholders in Lebanese companies will 
naturally give pause to potential passive investors, particularly those not in the country and able to 
actively monitor the organization in person.  In other words, individuals or entities that would perhaps 
commit foreign direct investment to promising Lebanese companies will be hesitant to do so because, 
once they purchase a minority stake in the company, they lose almost all leverage to protect their 
investment. Although, because so many Lebanese SMEs are family controlled, the natural tendency of 
family members to communicate and, hopefully, treat one another fairly when they are stakeholders 
should alleviate some concerns that all minority shareholders are at risk of being abused by the majority.  
However, those outside of the family – such as equity investors and investment groups looking to place 
foreign direct investment – will still legitimately not trust the family firms without corporate governance 
and institutional reforms, or other assurances. 
 Accordingly, the need to restructure corporate governance of family enterprises and curb 
corruption is important in Lebanon and directly tied to the need for better corporate governance.  As the 
former Lebanese government minister and corporate governance expert Nassir Saidi, writes, ―[corporate 
governance] principles and their effective implementation are essential tools for combating corruption 
and waste in Lebanon and corporate mal-governance that have taken their toll over the years in [several 
high-profile Lebanese corporate scandals].‖
170
  This collection of poor corporate governance influences 
creates disincentives for the management of these firms to act ethically in terms of minority shareholder 
treatment.   In essence, the weak external corporate governance from the Lebanese state creates a 
situation in which Lebanese small and medium-sized family businesses have chosen not to opt into 
international best practices because they are not required to take on that burden.  Yet, this may be a 
short-sighted deferral of adopting best practices that is both based on an inclination to remain insular and 
opaque, and to avoid becoming a target for bribery. 
 As a result, these Lebanese family-controlled SMEs (and SMEs in MENA generally) have, to 
date, not voluntarily adopted the corporate governance and ethics best practices put forth by the model 
codes discussed above in Section II.  Because these entities have not faced significant market pressure 
internally or externally from investors the way large publically traded and multinational companies 
have, they are not inviting targets for international investors.  Thus, because these businesses are not 
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transparent and do not provide proper minority shareholder protection, investors have not come forward 
to provide the capital necessary for growth.
171
 
 In effect, these small and medium-sized family enterprises have hit an ethical glass ceiling that 
stunts their growth and development.  If these entities would, along with the LCC and the Lebanese 
courts, provide adequate protections, investors would be more likely to put their capital and trust in 
Lebanese companies.  Because of poor corporate governance, Lebanese companies have a propensity to 
engage in short-term profit-maximizing corruption, to remain financially opaque, and to not voluntarily 
adopt governance mechanisms to protect investors by contract, or otherwise, the non-family investment 
never materializes.  These businesses are essentially limited in their growth potential to the equity stake 
investments they can raise from family members and Lebanese nationals within their trust network or 
through traditional high-interest and securitized bank loans.  To exacerbate the problem, it is likely that 
these entities do not perceive this short-term acquiescence to corruption as creating a ceiling to their 
long-term development and stability. 
It is also the case that these corporate governance factors that promote family enterprise 
insularity may wall off the business from corrupt government officials and bureaucrats.  For instance, if 
the family management, with the acquiescence of other owners, manipulates the entity‘s finances to 
show a loss, then the firm is a less attractive target for corrupt officials.  There is also a sense in MENA 
family enterprises that, because they are surrounded by acts of corruption, paying an accurate amount of 
tax is foolish since a corrupt political system will likely squander that payment and the taxes will never 
reach actual public works programs, like infrastructure development.  However, this tight-knit, defensive 
―circling the wagons‖ mentality also has negative spillovers.  The insularity can lead to a situation where 
there is an artificial cap on growth, again enabling the ethics glass ceiling effect.  The tendency of family 
enterprises in developing countries such as Lebanon to ―stay below the radar‖ of corrupt officials also 
makes the organization opaque and uninviting for potentially important outside stakeholders, including 
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V. Suggestions for Breaking Through the Glass Ceiling to Growth and Unanswered Questions 
 
    A. Strategies for Alleviating the Corruption Constraint on Businesses in MENA   
   To properly address the structural problems in corporate governance in Lebanon, and by example 
for the MENA region, the Lebanese legal system must make significant changes to the management 
structure of Lebanese domestic corporations, including family enterprises.  The simple goal of those 
changes is to formalize ethical stakeholder-focused protections and, thus, encourage greater equity-stake 
participation, particularly in the form of foreign direct investment from outside the country.  Moreover, 
these measures will bolster the ongoing movement by NGOs to change the prevailing culture of implicit 
support for corruption and resistance to corporate governance from the Lebanese business community.  
The unifying theme for these recommendations is that corporate governance improvements can aid 




 This requires a two-pronged approach.  Initially, there needs to be improved rules and ethical 
guidelines related to international corporate governance standards and, second, there needs to be 
consistent, fair and corruption-free enforcement of the rules.  To accomplish this fully, it is necessary to 
enact greater minority shareholder protection through changes to the LCC and through business-friendly 
court decisions for greater predictability, as well as proper enforcement from administrative agencies 
within the government.  In both instances the commitment to reform by the firms themselves is crucial.  
First, the Lebanese Code of Commerce should be changed to allow for the Western corporate 
model of chartered corporations with limited liability and officers as well as directors to manage the 
entity in the interests of the shareholders.
173
  At a minimum, the LCC should allow companies to opt-out 
of the unitary Board of Directors model and move toward encouraging a system of managing officers 
and overseer directors, in line with international best practices.   
This paradigm shift in corporate governance is essential because, at this point, there is little or no 
separation between the management and control of Lebanese companies.  Nor is there a specific 
enunciation of corporate fiduciary duties – including prohibitions on self-dealing, insider transactions, or 
a duty of loyalty.  While not expressly a problem for SMEs, this situation discourages ownership by 
non-family members or any minority shareholder, including foreign investors.  Furthermore, the LCC 
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should be amended to make clear the principle of ―one share, one vote,‖ which again will provide 
consistency and shareholder protection against an existing LCC mechanism whereby long-term 
corporate shareholders can increase their proportional ownership at the expense of new shareholders. 
Second, transparency should be encouraged through better regulation of the financial reporting 
requirements of firms, including greater tax enforcement by independent agencies that are corruption 
free.  These changes could include intra-corporation governance rules that require the development, 
adoption, and implementation of prohibitions against the firm or its agents engaging in or supporting 
corruption or nepotism.  In addition, these rules should provide for audit committees charged with 
monitoring the company and its agents, and ensuring that the entity refrains from corrupt acts and 
reports requests for bribes from government officials to independent government authorities or NGO 
monitors. 
As another solution, the well-appreciated corporate officer and director duties present in United 
States corporate governance should be absorbed into voluntary Lebanese codes of governance and, 
ideally, the LCC.  Without a provision for fiduciary duties and the attendant penalties for violating those 
duties, minority shareholders are left without protection or recourse for the abuse of management power 
over their investment.  The risks associated with settling for the corporate governance status quo are too 
high and, as a result, foreign direct investment in the country is relatively low,
174
 and the benefits of FDI 
are kept from Lebanese companies and the economy as a whole. 
 In the case of Lebanon, and elsewhere in MENA and the developing world where armed conflict 
and political and ethnic tensions are a reality, having strong and corruption-resistance family enterprises 
has an additional benefit.  Stakeholder-focused reforms that recognize the importance of external 
stakeholders for funding can have a reverberating influence by demonstrating a public stance against 
corruption to the rest of society.  In addition, stronger, more resilient businesses with a greater chance of 
smooth inter-generation succession can also potentially add to the stability of a nation because of the 
realization that commercial prosperity will increase employment and wealth, thus acting as a 
counterweight to instability and violence.  This sort of broad view of social impact remains consistent 
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with an expansive stakeholder approach to conducting the business of family enterprises, and the role of 
corporations as mediating institutions.
175
 
 At this point the question arises:  why have transparency and accountability for family 
enterprises that are privately held?  Multilateral model codes, for instance, are focused on large 
organizations with dispersed ownership and a separation between ownership and management.
176
  
Therefore, with these entities there is a need for disclosure to all stakeholders (internal and external) 
who might not otherwise be in a position to view and understand the organization‘s inner workings.  
However, with regard to internal stakeholders, SME financial disclosure is less crucial, as long as all 
owner and manager stakeholders are taking part in the very decisions that normally would need to be 
disclosed to a larger stakeholder base.   
Nonetheless, family business transparency remains crucial for external users of the firm‘s 
information, such as government tax agencies, as well as banks and other funding sources.  In cases 
where there is government oversight and anti-bribery laws, reporting might be required.
177
  However, 
another compelling reason is that well-run and transparent family enterprises, even when they need not 
be transparent in their expenditures, still have an ethical imperative to avoid immoral behavior, such as 
bribery.  Again, the tangible benefit to being transparent is that it can increase a family enterprise‘s 
access to financing, whether from traditional sources such as bank loans, or from potential equity 
investors.  Moreover, for firms in developing countries, there is a reward to being transparent and 
corruption-free if they want to reap the benefits of interaction with international customers, particularly 
foreign multinational companies that have ethics requirements of their suppliers.
178
   
Another reason that small and medium-sized family enterprises should be transparent, even 
though they are not required to (as are publically traded firms), is the ethical imperative that they, in the 
aggregate, ―have the opportunity to make a real difference by helping create a culture of zero tolerance 
towards bribery.‖
179
  In essence, the assertion is that all businesses are accountable to society.  This is 
consistent with the conclusion that overt corruption in the form of bribery violates an ethical hypernorm 
because that aversion cuts across nations, cultural settings, moral systems, and religious traditions.
180
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Bribery, thus, is wrong because it violates the hypernorm of necessary social efficiency by harming 
political participation and leading to the inefficient distribution of resources.
181
   
Voluntary adoption of better corporate governance for SMEs and FOEs may also encourage 
macro economic and social development.  While an individual SME takes on a short-term risk by 
innovating with corporate governance changes when it might be inclined to maintain the status quo, 
there are potential benefits to showing leadership in this regard.  Such a firm (or any individual 
stakeholder pushing for reform) would fit the description of an institutional entrepreneur.
182
  When an 
individual, or in this instance an entire organization, acts as an institutional entrepreneur in fighting 
corruption the result can be a change to the status quo such that corruption and its impact can be 
lessened.
183
  It is this sort of internalization of a culture of anti-corruption as opposed to the imposition 
of legal rules or a ―social edict‖ that is important in, as business ethics and corruption scholar Dean 
Steven Salbu has put it, not undermining the ―social and cultural foundations that most effectively 
translate policy into practice.‖
184
  Having the solutions to corruption coming, at least in part, from within 
indigenous firms in developing countries also circumvents the possible issue of imposing a sort of 
cultural imperialism in corruption control.
185
 
There are, however, clear short-term gains to, for instance, garnering an advantage over 
competitors by bribing a public official to favor an organization in a bidding contest for a public project.  
Therefore, management may take unethical actions that are nonetheless in the company‘s financial 
interest.  If the relevant internal stakeholders within the business are in agreement to act improperly, 
particularly if it is a family business where everyone agrees with the family leadership, the corruption is 
not a hidden tax on the organization and, thus, by extension the shareholder.  To the contrary, there are 
situations where conflicts of interest arise when an insider puts her self-interest ahead of the corporation 
and contracts for services on behalf of the business to the organization‘s disadvantage.  In that instance, 
clear governance and ethics rules on transparency and accountability are useful to protect the business 
and stakeholders from this temptation to gain a corruption-based advantage. 
Finally, the above critique of broad principles of accountability and transparency when applied to 
small and medium-sized family enterprises demonstrates that the generalized corporate governance and 
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ethics principles are useful for SMEs, but need to be adapted for these small and usually localized family 
organizations.  Specifically, rather than trying to apply a blanket set of transparency and accountability 
rules in a ―one size fits all‖ manner to all types of businesses, they must be scaled and tailored to benefit 
the entities. 
 
B. Additional Research on the Role of Corruption and a Business Ethics Glass Ceiling 
This paper is by its nature a theoretical analysis of the factors contributing to the business ethics 
glass ceiling proposed herein.  Consequently, additional research is necessary to fully chart the 
parameters of these constraints.  In that vein, several aspects of this paper‘s evaluation of the business 
ethics glass ceiling problem are useful in setting an agenda for understanding the governance issues 
related to corruption concerns impacting firm growth and development.  
 First and foremost, more empirical research is needed to further clarify the link between business 
ethics issues, particularly corruption, and business reform.  Until now much of the research has been 
limited to the large scale evaluations of corruption and the cost of compliance for large companies 
forced to take on more mechanisms for transparency and accountability.  These include the omnibus 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
186
 compiled by Transparency International, the World Bank‘s Doing 
Business report
187
 and social science research focused on political corruption.
188
  For instance, the CPI is 
published each year and has grown to include over 180 countries.  The CPI is developed by country 
affiliates so there is some localized expertise being sought, although the instrument measures perceived 
corruption from business persons around the world, and does not gauge actual corruption.
189
  Similarly, 
the Doing Business report takes stock of important rule of law indicators related to business activity.  
However it leaves out any integration of cultural, political, and ethical analysis.  In both cases, the CPI 
and Doing Business reports fail to account for the unique governance situation in each country and are 
less useful for gauging the confluence of inputs which create the glass ceiling at a local level. 
On the corporate governance side there are numerous international guidelines in the form of 
model corporate governance codes
190
 and a growing number of country-specific codes.
191
  However, 
there is a deficit of academic research showing a before and after picture of the usefulness of such codes 
beyond the rhetorical and symbolic nature of solidifying guidelines.  Moreover, as argued here, there is a 
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general lack of research on the relation between business ethics and corporate governance in SMEs and 
family businesses.
192
  As two corporate law scholars writing about the Middle East have acknowledged, 
―[i]t is easy for the state to draft legislation that would facilitate formation of limited liability forms of 
business organizations,‖ but that despite the support of multilateral funders, ―[m]any Middle East 
countries, however, have steadfastly resisted efforts at substantive reform and still place substantial 
roadblocks in the path of small-business creation.‖
193
 
It has also been observed that in the case of corruption there are differences between the calculus 
of those engaging in petty bribery and those involved in grand bribery, from both the bribe asker and the 
bribe payer perspectives.
194
  While there are debilitating effects of either type of corruption, the exact 
impact of those activities on SMEs and family businesses is uncertain.  Thus, it will be important in 
coming years for there to be additional research beyond investigations into the raw cost of a corruption 
tax in terms of estimated economic losses, but also related to the psychological barriers to investment, 
reinvestment, capital flight, and FDI in emerging markets.  It would also be useful to have a detailed 
time series picture of what happens to regions that adopt a corporate governance-driven business ethics 
reform agenda to better understand the constraints placed on businesses of every size.  Put another way, 
it would be advantageous to see over a period of time what happens to business growth once 
institutional and corruption constraints are removed.   
Similarly, there is a need for empirical research such as surveys of SMEs and FOEs to further 
map the influence of business ethics constraints, including the glass ceiling.  Such an assessment of 
these small and medium firms in developing countries could help determine the depth to which their 
growth and access to FDI and equity capital in general is restricted by corruption and weak corporate 
governance.  This research might also identify the structural reasons why managers and shareholders in 
developing country SMEs have been slow to opt out of a cycle of corruption and opt into voluntary 
reforms such as better corporate governance.  Further theoretical work on which factors contributing to 
the glass ceiling are most important in various contexts and their interaction would also be useful in 
understanding the role of corporate governance and corruption in these firms. 
Again, in general, much of the current ethics and governance research is focused on large, 
publically traded companies.  For example, ongoing reviews of the role of U.S. legislation, such as 
Sarbanes-Oxley, will not be relevant to small and medium enterprises and the vast majority of family 
businesses, save the relatively limited number of very large ones.  In this regard additional research on 
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the role of trust networks in the financing of SMEs and family business in the developing world would 
assist in illuminating possible reforms to encourage and enable companies to move beyond a small 
network of trusted financiers and also move past a glass ceiling on growth which restricts access to 
outside investors. 
As a basic matter, scholars‘ insights would be aided by both a broader and a regionally-focused 
understanding of the role of corporate governance in influencing business ethics and fighting corruption. 
Ultimately, any insights gained from this research in the MENA region will also be useful in 
understanding the hindrances to family businesses and small enterprises in other developing regions, 
which also inevitably face corruption and other ethics challenges.
195





Despite the proliferation of corporate governance and business ethics best practices in the last 
few decades and the push to implement those guidelines in family businesses and SMEs in MENA, there 
is much additional work to be done.  The first step is to recognize the barriers such as the business ethics 
glass ceiling to implementing these best practices to promote organizational growth and development.  
Beyond those policy prescriptions there is also a need for both broader and deeper research on the 
subject to better understand the links between business ethics failings such as corruption and weak 
governance, alongside cultural and social, and political and economic influences. 
The efforts to develop corporate governance and business ethics codes that are properly scaled to 
address family enterprise issues in the Middle East are necessary first steps.  The way to sustain higher 
levels of investment is to eliminate ethics-based barriers to small and medium-sized family enterprise 
growth in the region by working for systemic reforms from MENA governments.  However, realistically 
many MENA governments are autocratic and resistant to change without serious pressure, both 
internally and externally.  Accordingly, the next best alternative is to convince family enterprises that 
voluntarily adding best practices to their internal governance schemes will have market-based benefits in 
the long-term.  More comprehensive research sketching out the parameters of the ethics glass ceiling and 
quantifying its restraint on growth will also aid in making compelling arguments to governments, 
investors, and interested NGOs that speedy corporate governance reform is essential. 
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For good reason MENA regional commentators are cautious when expressing optimism for 
corporate governance reform and a related drop in ethical lapses, such as corruption.  For example, calls 
by local academics to increase the quality of human capital in the region are infused with the painfully 
obvious caveat that, ―[c]learly, implementing measures to enhance security and facilitate social and 
political stability is a prerequisite.‖
196
  Still, with serious attention to governance reforms there is cause 
for optimism that MENA‘s SMEs and family enterprises will emerge from this period of transition with 
a stronger and more growth-friendly corporate governance framework, as well as an appreciation of 
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